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Budget Rules and Monetary Union
in Europe
Among the most controversial issues in the con-
tinuing debate over the path to an economic and
monetary union (EMU) in Europe is the extent to
which fiscal policies must converge among mem-
ber countries to ensure its' success. One view
holds that, with a unified central bank, rules to
ensure fiscal convergence are necessary to limit
the potential disruptiveness of divergent govern-
ment financing needs on the operation of a mon-
etary union. Most policymakers seem to share
this opinion, and stringent measures on fiscal dis-
cipline were incorporated into the agreement on
monetary union reached at Maastricht, Nether-
lands in December 1991. In particular, the treaty
includes an "excessive deficits procedure" that
would limit budget deficits to less than 3 percent
of GOP and total government debt levels to less
than 60 percent of GOP.
agreed to limit exchange rate fluctuations among
themselves. Since then, convergence among
EMS members towards lower levels of average
monetary growth and inflation is clearly evident.
Between 1975-1978 and 1987-1990, the cross-
country variability of broad money growth (meas-
ured by the standard deviation) fell by almost
half; the variability ofthe inflation rate fell by
two-thirds. Over the same period, average an-
nual broad monetary growth declined by about 7
percentage points to 7.4 percent, and the average
inflation rate declined about 5 percentage points
to 4.2 percent, reflecting the weight of conserva-
tive German monetary policies within the EMS.
This is consistent with the view that maintaining
fixed exchange rates has constrained EMS mem-
ber countries in conducting divergent monetary
policies.
In terms of fiscal policy, however, there is little
evidence of any convergence associated with
EMS participation. The standard deviation of
general government budget deficits as a percent
of GOP in member countries remained un-
changed between 1975-1978 and 1987-1990
(see Chart 1). Moreover, average general gov-
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Another view, however, holds that,so long as the
central bank is prohibited from financing individ-
ual government budget deficits, rules to ensure
fiscal convergence are not strictly necessary and
may even be undesirable. Binding public finance
rules are unnecessary, it is argued, because pri-
vate markets will impose sufficient discipline on
excessive government borrowing by charging
higher interest rates and compelling governments
to balance their budgets over time. Rules also
may be undesirable if they limit individual mem-
bers' abilityto use budget policy as a stabilization
tool, especially since both monetary and exchange
rate instruments are not available for this purpose
within a monetary union.
This Weekly Letter considers international evi-
dence which sheds light on this debate by look-
ing at the degree of budget "discipline" and
convergence in member states of various mon-
etary arrangements: the European Monetary
System (EMS), quasi-monetary unions, and full-
fledged monetary unions.
Monetary and fiscal convergence in the EMS
The EMS began operation in 1979 when its seven
initial members-Germany, France, Italy, Nether-
lands, Belgium, Denmark, and Luxembourg-FRBSF
decreased less than V2 percent between these
two periods to 4.4 percent. (See Chart 1.) Thus
the move to greater exchange rate stability within
the EMS, as well as the convergence to greater
price stability and lower money growth, does not
seem to have provided effective constraints or
incentives to lower fiscal deficit variability.
Further light on the relationship between mone-
tary and exchange rate regimes and convergence
is shed by comparing the experience of the initial
EMS members with a representative group of
other industrial countries that followed flexible
exchange rates for most of the 1980s, including
the U.S., Japan, U.K., Canada, Australia, and
Switzerland. For flexible rate countries there is
little evidence of monetary convergence during
the past decade; broad monetary growth rates
actually diverged further (although convergence
toward a lower common inflation rate occurred).
Also in contrast with the EMS, these countries ex-
perienced a greater degree of fiscal convergence.
Average general government deficit positions in
the flexible rate countries declined by more than
2 percentage points between 1975-1978 and
1987-1990, improving to a small surplus of 0.4
percent of GDP. Moreover, the standard devia-
tion ofthe budget surplus measure ofthe flexible
rate group was only half of that of the EMS group
during the 1987-1990 period. Thus, compared to
floating rate countries, the members of the EMS
appear to have experienced less movement to-
wards fiscal convergence.
Fiscal convergence in quasi-monetary unions
The exchange rate-monetary relationship of
Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria can be
characterized as a quasi-monetary union. The
exchange rate between the DM and the Dutch
Guilder has been the most stable within the EMS:
Between 1979 and 1984 the bilateral nominal
exchange rate was realigned by more'than 2 per-
centage points only twice, and the exchange rate
has been virtually unchanged since 1984. Out-
side the EMS, even greater stability has been
evident in the exchange rate relationship of
Germany and Austria. Since 1980 the Austrian
National Bank has followed a pure peg against
the DM, successfully keeping the schilling within
a very narrow band around the DM. These rela-
tively stable exchange rate relationships have
been maintained by closely aligned monetary
policies. Dutch and Austrian short-term inter-
est rates have typically moved in step with
Germany's.
In 1978 all three countries had roughly similar
general government budget deficits of around
2V2 percent of GDP. Despite participation in a
quasi-monetary union, however, the budgetary
positions in Germany, the Netherlands, and
Austria, in fact, have widened in the past decade.
Germany's deficit peaked at 3.7 percent in 1982,
and then gradually fell through the end of the
decade until a small surplus of 0.2 of GDP was
recorded in 1989. (The costs of reunification with
East Germany in 1990 resulted in a reversion to
large deficits.) Like Germany, the Dutch govern-
ment's financial borrowing as a percentage of
GDP peaked in the early 1980s. However, the
Dutch government had much less success in re-
ducing its fiscal spending (in part due to the loss
of natural gas revenues in the mid 1980s); only
once since 1981 have Dutch deficits fallen below
5 percent of GDP. Government deficits in Austria
also have followed a different pattern from those
in Germany. They declined somewhat in 1978-
1981, rose intermittently in 1982-1987 to a peak
of 4.3 percent of GDp, and again declined in
1988-1990.
The wide differences in the current fiscal posi-
tions of these three countries indicate that their
quasi-monetary union relationship has resulted
in little if any fiscal convergence.
Fiscal convergence in full-fledged
monetary unions
What has been the degree of fiscal convergence
within full-fledged monetary unions? Studies by
De Grauwe (1990)' and Lamfalussy (1989) show
that the average budgetdeficits of the member
states or provinces in monetary unions with a
single independent central bank, such as the
United States, Germany, Canada, Australia, and
Switzerland, have tended to be lower than the
average deficit among countries in the European
Community (EC). The comparison also indicates
that the standard deviation of budget deficits of
states or provinces within monetary unions tended
to be somewhat smaller than that of countries in
the EC. (See Chart 2.) This suggests prohibiting
the central bank of a monetary union from financ-
ing member government deficits contributes to
lower average deficit levels and deficit variability.
Nevertheless, the result that the standard devi-
ation of deficits within full-fledged monetary
unions is nonzero suggests that member states
still retain some autonomy over setting budget
deficits over the short and medium term.
What is the evidence on the need for additional
fiscal policy rules within full-fledged monetary
unions? Among the countries shown in Chart 2,
only Australia and Germany have centrally im-
posed fiscal rules. In Australia permanent federalcontrols limit state borrowing. In Germany, the
Lander are constitutionally bound (except under
special circumstances) to limit their borrowing
to the financing of investment. In contrast, deficit
spending"by Canadian provinces and Swiss can-
tons is not subject to legal constraints. Similarly,
there are no centrally imposed constraints on
state borrowing in the U.s., although restraints
are usually self-imposed via state constitutions or
statute. There is no evidence that Canada; Swit-
zerland, and the U.S. have had higher average
budget deficit levels among their states than
states in Australia and Germany have had. This
suggests that prohibiting the central bank of a
monetary union from financing member state fis-
cal deficits suffices to ensure budget discipline-
that is, additional centrally imposed binding fiscal








However, the experience of member states in
full-fledged monetary unions, such as the United
States, Germany, Canada, Australia, and Switzer-
land, suggests that centrally imposed fiscal rules
are not necessary for the success of monetary
unions. In particular, member states in monetary
unions generally experience relatively low budg-
etary deficits even without federal constraints on
spending and borrowing. Significant divergence
in the budgetary positions of member states was
also observed, consistent with the view that
discretion in the conduct of short-term fiscal pol-
icy need not be disruptive in monetary unions.
Interpreted most broadly, this evidence suggests
that the "excessive deficits procedure" adopted
in Maastricht may be unnecessary to ensure the
success of a European monetary union. Inter-
preted more narrowly, it suggests that the criteria
of the "excessive deficits procedure" are overly
rigid in setting specific constraints on the levels
of debt and deficits of member governments.
Requiring governments to balance budgets over
longer periods may provide a better criterion that
would permit greater short-term flexibility in ex-
ercisingfiscal policy. This is particuiariy desirabie
in view of the fact that monetary union mem-
bership limits the independent exercise of other














Fiscal Surpluses Across Member States in
Monetary Unions as Percent of GDP
Average Standard Dev.
Implications
The empirical evidence suggests that fixed rate
regimes and quasi-monetary unions do not pro-
vide strong pressure toward fiscal convergence in
the short to medium term. Although some budget
consolidation occurred in the original EMS mem-
bers since the late 1970s, even greater reductions
in budget deficits were generally observed in
countries with flexible rate regimes. Moreover,
the divergence in fiscal positions among EMS
countries did not narrow despite more than a
decade of commitment to a fixed exchange rate
regime. Evidence on countries in quasi-monetary
unions (Germany, the Netherlands and Austria)
also points to wide divergences in budgetary
positions.
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The FRBSF Weekly Letter appears on an abbreviated schedule in june, july, August, and December.